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Abstract 
Economic growth and unemployment exhibit an ambiguous relationship – according to 
empirical studies. This ambiguity can be investigated by observing the role of the 
underground economy in shaping the productivity of firms. Indeed, unemployment may be 
absorbed by underground firms, which adopt backward technology, at the cost of reduced 
economic growth. Alternatively, unemployment diminishes because productivity grows by 
employing workers who prefer to become skilled, and thus not to work in underground firms. 
This paper develops these arguments by using a matching model with underground firms and 
heterogeneous entrepreneurial ability, and by assuming skill-driven growth. Economic 
growth thus becomes endogenous, and both the underground sector and unemployment 
become persistent. The main result is that, under conditions of strict monitoring of the 
regularity of firms, the underground economy is squeezed, unemployment is reduced, and 
growth is high, whereas in the case of lax monitoring, the underground economy expands, 
unemployment is absorbed, and growth is low. 
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1. Introduction 
Economic growth and unemployment are not always inversely related (Pissarides and Vallanti 
2004, 2007) because an ambiguous relationship has also been found both across countries and 
across long periods of time in the same country (Aghion and Howitt, 1994; Bean and 
Pissarides, 1993; Caballero, 1993; Hoon and Phelps, 1997; Muscatelli and Tirelli, 2001). 
Theoretical explanations have usually focused on technological progress in order to determine 
the conditions that make productivity growth employment-friendly or employment-
displacing.1 This paper takes a different approach by exploring the role of the underground 
economy in shaping the productivity of firms, so that growth and unemployment can be 
affected in different ways. Indeed, unemployment may be absorbed by underground firms, 
which adopt backward technology (see, e.g., La Porta and Shleifer, 2008), at the cost of 
reduced economic growth. In this case, the relationship between growth and unemployment 
emerges as positive, and the relationships between underground employment and 
unemployment emerges as negative. But both signs are reversed in a different case, i.e. when 
unemployment and the underground economy diminish because productivity grows by 
employing workers who prefer to become skilled, and thus not to work in underground firms.2 
Studying the ambiguous relationship between economic growth and unemployment by 
focusing on the underground economy is especially interesting for policy purposes. In fact, 
new policies can be envisaged to increase economic growth and to reduce unemployment. 
Moreover, combating the underground economy, which is undesirable for fiscal and moral 
reasons, may avoid the counter-indication that unemployment could increase. 
This paper studies these issues by adopting a matching-type of model, which has been 
used in the literature to study both the relationship between growth and unemployment (Laing 
et al., 1995; Aghion and Howitt, 1994, 1998; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998; Pissarides, 
1990, 2000; Mortensen, 2005), and the relationship between the underground employment 
and unemployment (Bouev, 2002, 2005; Kolm and Larsen, 2003, 2010; Fugazza and Jacques, 
                                                 
1
 If the technological progress is disembodied, i.e. both old and new jobs benefit from higher labour productivity, 
the “capitalisation” effect yields a lower unemployment in the steady-state (Pissarides, 1990); whereas, if the 
technological progress is embodied, i.e. only the new jobs benefit from higher labour productivity, the “creative 
destruction” effect yields an increase in steady-state unemployment (Aghion and Howitt, 1994, 1998). 
2
 A variety of evidence shows that regular firms employ skilled labour, while underground firms employ 
unskilled labour (Agénor and Aizenman, 1999; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002, 2006; Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 
2009; Cimoli, Primi and Pugno, 2006; Kolm and Larsen, 2010), and that employment in the underground sector 
and the education level within countries appear to be negatively correlated (Albrecht et. al., 2009; Cappariello 
and Zizza, 2009). 
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2004; Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 2009; Albrecht et al., 2009).3 In particular, this second body 
of studies discusses a further connected issue called the ‘shadow puzzle’, i.e. the persistence 
of the underground economy in a variety of contexts and times (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002, 
2006). However, as far as we are aware, no study has attempted to deal with all these issues at 
the same time. 
This paper assumes that entrepreneurial ability is heterogeneous among individuals. 
This assumption follows the approach of heterogeneous talent allocation, which allows the 
partition of the economy between regular and underground firms (Lucas, 1978; Baumol, 
1990; Rauch, 1991; van Praag and Cramer, 2001). Secondly, the paper assumes that 
participating to the underground economy involves a moral cost, thus following the idea that 
both economic incentives and social norms drive individual behaviour (Traxler 2010; Kolm 
and Larsen 2002; Elster 1989). This assumption allows to separate the individuals according 
to which they search for a job in the underground or in the regular economy. The third key 
assumption is that education and skill are crucial for economic growth (Laing et al., 1995), so 
that endogenous economic growth can emerge. Also this assumption has received a great deal 
of attention in the literature (Romer, 1986, 1988, 1989; Lucas, 1988; Rebelo, 1991; Stokey, 
1991; Savvides and Stengos, 2009). 
The conclusions will show the importance of monitoring the regularity of firms to 
determine the allocation of entrepreneurial ability, the size of the underground economy, the 
investment in education and skills, and economic growth. Specifically, under conditions of 
strict monitoring, the underground economy is squeezed, unemployment is reduced, and 
growth is high, whereas in case of lax monitoring, the underground economy expands, 
unemployment is thus absorbed, and growth is low. These conclusions, which cover different 
issues at the same time, can contribute to the debate on the role of the underground economy 
in economic development and on the policy implications (de Soto, 1989; Johnson et al., 2000; 
Friedman et al., 2000; Farrell, 2004; Carillo and Pugno, 2004; Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; 
Cimoli, Primi and Pugno, 2006; La Porta and Shleifer, 2008). 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the static version of the model 
and finds the steady-state solutions, thus contributing to better understanding of the 
persistence of the underground economy (called issue (i)), and the relationship between the 
underground employment and unemployment (issue (ii)). Section 3 makes the model dynamic 
                                                 
3
 According to Bouev’s (2002, 2005) matching model, scaling down the underground sector may lead to a 
decrease in unemployment, whereas, according to Boeri and Garibaldi’s (2002, 2006) matching model, attempts 
to reduce shadow employment will result in higher open unemployment. 
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by introducing investments in education, so that the steady-growth solutions can be identified, 
hence contributing to a better understanding of the relationship between growth and 
unemployment (issue (iii)). This section also provides some evidence on the role of 
monitoring the regularity of firms in the relationship between growth and unemployment by 
considering a broad cross-section of countries. Section 4 concludes the paper with some 
remarks on policy implications, while the appendices set out the relevant proofs and 
mathematical details. 
 
2. The model with underground sector and unemployment 
This section will show how the differentiation of the economy in two sectors, i.e. the regular 
and the underground sector, emerges essentially because the population of the economy has 
different levels of ability, and exploits the different production opportunities that are 
available. The presentation of the model starts with the matching equations that describe both 
how firms emerge from matching the vacancies with job seekers, and the possibility of the 
economy to differentiate in the two sectors. 
 
2.1 The matching framework  
The proposed model is of general equilibrium unemployment (Mortensen and 
Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 2000), where numerous firms produce the same type of good, but 
adopt different institutional set-ups and production techniques. They may be registered, and 
therefore pay a production tax and adopt a relatively advanced technique; or they may be non-
registered, and therefore evade taxes and adopt a less efficient technique. Hence non-
registered firms form the underground or shadow sector of the economy, which is illegal 
because of the process employed, not because of the goods being produced. 
As is usual in matching-type models (Pissarides, 2000; Petrongolo and Pissarides, 
2001), the meeting of vacant jobs and unemployed workers is regulated by an aggregate 
matching function ( )uvmm ,= , where v measures the vacancies, and u  is the unemployed 
rate, thus excluding on-the-job-search. The entrepreneurs open vacancies (one-job firms), that 
can be of two different types, either regular or underground, thus forming an economy with 
two sectors. Unemployed workers can search for a job only in one of the two sectors, so that 
iv  and iu  are sector-specific, namely ‘directed search’ is assumed.
4
 The matching function 
                                                 
4
 If the unemployed could search for a job in both sectors simultaneously, it is said that the assumption is of 
‘random search’. 
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can thus be written as ( )iiii uvmm ,= , where { }sri ,∈  denotes the sector (r = regular sector, s 
= shadow sector). This function has the usual properties of being non-negative, increasing and 
concave in both arguments and performing constant returns to scale. Therefore, the job-
finding rate, ( ) ( ) ( )1 ,/, iiiii muuvmg θθ == , is positive, increasing and concave in the so-called 
market tightness, i.e. iii uv /≡θ , and the vacancy-filling rate, ( ) ( ) ( )1 ,1/, −== iiiii mvuvmf θθ , 
is a positive, decreasing and convex function in iθ . Furthermore, the Inada-type conditions 
hold: ( ) ( ) ∞==
∞→→ ii gf ii θθ θθ limlim 0 ; ( ) ( ) 0limlim 0 == →∞→ ii gf ii θθ θθ . Indeed, the 
matching functions of the two sectors may be different, but evidence is lacking in this regard. 
For ease of presentation, the Bellman equations are written by already differentiating 
the two sectors (and specified to find infinite horizon steady-state solutions), i.e.:5 
( )[ ]sssss VJfcrV −+−=  θ     ( )[ ]rrrrr VJfcrV −+−=  θ  
( )[ ]sssss JVwxyrJ −++−=  ρδ                  ( ) [ ]rrrrr JVwhxyrJ −+−−=  δτ  
( )[ ]ssss WUwrW −++=  ρδ    [ ]rrrr WUwrW −+=  δ  
( )[ ]ssss UWgzrU −+=  θ                ( )[ ]rrrr UWgzrU −+=  θ  
where Vi is the value of a vacancy; Ji is the value of a filled job; Ui is the value for seeking a 
job; Wi is the value for being employed; ci is the cost to post a vacancy; x is entrepreneurial 
ability; yi is labour productivity, which depends – in the regular sector – on human capital of 
workers, h; wi is the wage rate; τ is an exogenous production tax; ρ is the monitoring rate, i.e. 
the exogenous instantaneous probability of a firm being discovered (and destroyed) as 
unregistered; δ is the exogenous destruction rate; z
 
is the opportunity cost of employment. 
The parameters r, ρ and δ are always considered as positive and given, while ci, yi, τ and z are 
positive and given but they will change endogenously in section 3. Similarly, h is assumed as 
temporarily given, since it will be determined in section 3, thus also affecting wi. The 
entrepreneurial ability x is heterogeneous among individuals, as discussed in the next 
subsection, so that the solutions of the equations will depend on x.  
Precisely, the wage rate in both sectors is assumed to be the outcome of bargaining 
between one of the workers who seeks a job in the sector and the entrepreneur endowed with 
the minimum level of ability to open vacancies, i.e. minx  (see subsection 2.2): 
                                                 
5
 It is further assumed that time is continuous and individuals are risk neutral, live infinitely and discount the 
future at the exogenous and positive interest rate r. 
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( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( )sssssssssss VJUWVJUWw ss −⋅−=−⇒−⋅−=
−
β
βββ
1
maxarg 1  
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( )rrrrrrrrrrr VJUWVJUWw rr −⋅−=−⇒−⋅−=
−
β
βββ
1
maxarg 1  
where the parameter ( )1 ,0∈iβ , with { }sri ,∈ , is the worker’s bargaining power. Simple 
manipulations thus yield: 
( ) ( ) ( )( )ssssssss rVyxrUw θβθβ −⋅⋅+⋅−= min1  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )rrrrrrrr rVhyxrUw θβθβ −⋅⋅+⋅−= min1  
The property that ( ) 0' >iiw θ  i ∀  holds, since ( ) 0' <iiV θ , and ( ) 0' >iiU θ  i ∀ . 
Therefore, the wage rate depends, in particular, on the labour productivity, which is 
homogeneous within each sector, i.e. iy , with { }sri ,∈ , but not on the heterogeneity of the 
entrepreneurial ability x. All entrepreneurs of each sector thus adopt the same wage rate, i.e. 
iw . This result, which may appear unusual, can be justified by the following grounds: first, 
the entrepreneurial ability may include the ability to bargain the wage, so that the greater is 
the entrepreneurial x  with respect to the minimum minx , the greater is the ability to put an 
upward limit to wages, secondly, workers may be unable to distinguish entrepreneurs for their 
ability during wage bargaining, while it is common knowledge that labour productivity is 
homogeneous within each sector. 
The surplus of a job in each sector is defined as the sum of the worker’s and firm’s 
value of being on the job, net of the respective outside options, so that iiiii UWVJS −+−= . 
Using the Bellman equations, we get: 
( ) ( ) ( )ssss
sss
s gfr
czyxS
θβθβρδ ⋅+⋅−+++
+−⋅
=
1
; ( ) ( ) ( )
rrrr
rrr
r gfr
czyxS
θβθβδ
τ
⋅+⋅−++
+−−⋅
=
1
. 
Note that the heterogeneity of the surpluses is due to the overall heterogeneity of 
entrepreneurial ability x. The expected present values of vacancies for firms can be also 
obtained, since ( ) ( ) ssss SVJ ⋅−=− β1  and ( ) ( ) rrrr SVJ ⋅−=− β1 , i.e.: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )ssss
sssssss
s gfr
grczyxf
rV
θβθβρδ
θβρδβθ
⋅+⋅−+++
⋅+++⋅−−⋅⋅−⋅
=
1
1
                               [1] 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )
rrrr
rrrrrrr
r gfr
grczyxf
rV
θβθβδ
θβδτβθ
⋅+⋅−++
⋅++⋅−−−⋅⋅−⋅
=
1
1
                    [2] 
As in Fonseca et al. (2001), we ignore the range beyond which iθ  (≡ ii uv ) is large 
enough to turn irV  negative. Hence, u must remain positive, and vi must be restricted below 
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some bound, say iv~ . Furthermore, in order to exclude the case of 0=iθ , where the vacancy 
would be always filled, 0≠iv  being 0≠iu , so that the relevant interval for vi becomes 
∈iv ]0, iv~ [, i ∀ . Therefore, the wages of both sectors, which positively depend on iθ , are 
upper bounded. 
Empirical evidence suggests that underground employment regards low productivity 
jobs (Agénor and Aizenman, 1999; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2002, 2006; Cimoli, Primi and 
Pugno, 2006; Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 2009; Mattos and Ogura, 2009). Therefore, our first 
key assumption is the following: 
Assumption 1. Labour productivity is much higher in the regular sector with respect 
to the underground sector: rs yy << . 
If labour productivity in the regular sector is sufficiently higher, then 
sr ww >  for any 
size of the two sectors, because, in particular, sw  is upper bounded. Higher wages in the 
regular sector are in fact rather common in the literature (Rauch, 1991; Fugazza and Jacques, 
2003; Kolm and Larsen, 2003; Amaral and Quintin, 2006; Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006; 
Albrecht et al., 2009). 
 
2.2 Moral cost, entrepreneurial ability and the underground sector 
Following the idea that both economic incentives and social norms drive individual 
behaviour, we assume that participating to the shadow economy involves a moral cost, 
because the individual may feel a sense of guilt or remorse to deviate from the social norm 
(Traxler 2010; Kolm and Larsen 2002; Elster 1989). Indeed, different individuals may bear a 
moral cost as a non-pecuniary cost and to different extents. Let us call define this moral cost 
with the variable R according to the following assumption: 
Assumption 2. The moral cost R is distributed over a unitary set of a continuum of 
infinitely-living individuals who expect to participate to the shadow economy. This cost can 
be measured in a continuous manner, [ ]max,0 RR ∈ , following the known c.d.f. 
[ ] [ ]1,0,0: max →RG . 
This cost is assumed independent from the present values, i.e. ( )RUr s −⋅  and 
( )RVr s −⋅ . While this condition simplifies the analysis without loss of generality, the 
heterogeneity of R makes it possible to separate individuals who search for a job in the 
underground sector or not, thus substantiating the assumption of ‘directed search’. In fact, the 
condition: 
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( )
rSrs UURUrRUr −=⇒⋅=−⋅ ~                                                                                          [3] 
yields a threshold (reservation) value R~  which separates the individuals whose moral cost is 
relatively low, thus inducing him to search for an irregular job, i.e. RR ~< , from the 
individuals who feel a high moral cost, and prefer to search for a job in the regular sector, i.e. 
RR ~≥ . As a consequence, more pervasive is the underground sector (i.e. the higher is sθ  
with respect to rθ ), more people search for a job in this sector (i.e. the higher is the threshold 
value R~ ), since the outside opportunity is higher. 
A more important role in the model is played by the entrepreneurial ability of 
individuals x, because it determines whether they post a vacancy in one or the other sector. 
More precisely, let us assume the following: 
Assumption 3. Entrepreneurial ability x is distributed over the whole set of individuals 
who expect to participate in production activity either as entrepreneurs or as workers. This 
ability can be measured in a continuous manner, [ ]max,0 xx ∈ , following the known c.d.f. 
[ ] [ ]1,0,0: max →xF . 
The individual must be endowed with a minimum level of entrepreneurial ability in 
order to open a vacancy, thus becoming an entrepreneur. As will shortly be made clear, this 
minimum level is required to enter the underground sector only, because the level of ability 
required to enter the regular sector is even higher. Thus, the minimum ability required to 
become an entrepreneur ( minx ) can be obtained from the zero-profit condition in the 
underground sector, because an individual with entrepreneurial ability x can always choose 
between posting a vacancy and searching for a job: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 02lim min0 >
⋅
===⇒=⇒−⋅=−⋅
→
s
rS
v
rSss y
z
xVUVURVrRUr
s
                                 [4] 
This result is due to the following: zU S
s
=
→0
lim
θ
, which is obtained in a straightforward manner 
from the Bellman equation for sU , and  zyxV sS
s
−⋅=
→0
lim
θ
 by applying the l’Hôpital rule to 
the Bellman equation for sV . Therefore, the zero-profit condition can be used to distinguish 
entrepreneurs from workers.6 Since for 0>r , izwi ∀≥ , , then ii UW ≥ . Indeed, from 
equation [4], we obtain that the productivity level of the less able entrepreneur is twice the 
                                                 
6
 In a framework with a fixed number of firms, the zero-profit condition is no longer used to determine the 
labour-market tightness (see Fonseca et al., 2001, and Pissarides, 2002). Note that entrepreneurs will earn extra-
profit as a rent in posting vacancies, because ability is not tradable. 
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opportunity cost of employment, zxys ⋅=⋅ 2min . Hence, the worker always finds it optimal to 
work for the current employer instead of searching for a new one. 
Lemma 1. All the individuals endowed with minxx ≥  expect to profitably open a 
vacancy, thus becoming entrepreneurs, while the individuals, labelled with l and endowed 
with minxx < , will not post any vacancy, thus becoming workers. 
The distinction between individuals who post a vacancy in the underground sector and 
those who post a vacancy in the regular sector must take into account their entrepreneurial 
ability and their moral cost if they participate to the underground economy. It rather natural to 
assume that the higher is entrepreneurial ability, the higher is moral cost, because 
entrepreneurial ability can be better displayed if it does not violate social norms. In formulae: 
( ) xxRR ⋅== κ                                                                                                                         [5] 
with 0>κ , so that ( )maxmax xRR > . Therefore, since the level of entrepreneurial ability is 
lower in the underground sector, the moral cost becomes an increasing function of the size of 
the regular sector (Kolm and Larsen, 2002; Pugno and Lisi, 2011). 
Let us define a threshold level of entrepreneurial ability [ ]maxmin , xxT ∈  such that two 
entrepreneurs drawn from the two sectors yield equal expected profitability, i.e.: 
( ) ( ) TTxVTxV sr ⋅−=== κ                                                             [6] 
T  can therefore be derived from equations [1], [2], and [6]: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) κ
τ
rByAy
BBczAAczT
sr
sr
++−+
+⋅+−+⋅++
=
11
11
                                                                              [7] 
with ( )( ) ( )
rr
rr
f
grA
θβ
θβδ
⋅−
⋅++
≡
1
 and ( )( ) ( )ss
ss
f
gr
B
θβ
θβρδ
⋅−
⋅+++
≡
1
. 
Equation [7] defines T as a special x, so that the condition 0min >≥ xx  requires that 
0>T . Sufficient conditions for 0>T  are that both the numerator and the denominator of [7] 
are positive. The numerator is positive if ( ) scz >+τ , zcr > , and sr cc > , which are realistic 
conditions.7 The denominator is positive if ry  (augmented by the moral cost to open an 
irregular vacancy as captured by κ) is sufficiently greater than sy , which is a necessary 
condition for the regular sector to be able to survive, and it qualifies our Assumption 1. A 
further result can be obtained from these restrictions which characterises the entrepreneurs’ 
                                                 
7
 The cost to post a vacancy in the underground sector cs should be very low, since ease of entry is often one of 
the criteria used to define the informal sector (Gërxhani, 2004). By contrast, the cost cr is often very heavy 
because of regulations, administrative burdens, licence fees and bribery (Bouev, 2005). 
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choice: the intercept of ( )xVr  is lower than the intercept of ( )xVs , and the slope of ( )xVr  is 
steeper than the slope of ( )xVs  (see Fig. 1). 
========== Fig. 1 about here (now at the end) ========== 
Note that another threshold for R emerges, i.e. ( )TxR = , which separates the 
entrepreneurs of the two sectors. Since R is a positive function of x, this threshold is greater 
than the other threshold R~ , which separates individuals who search for a job (workers). More 
precisely, it must be true that: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0~minmax =>>=>=>= xRRxxRTxRxxR . 
From the macroeconomic point of view, the entrepreneurs’ indifference condition [6] 
implies that, given the set of entrepreneurs l−1 , the share of entrepreneurs who open a 
vacancy in the regular sector is: 
( ) rvTF =−1                                      [8] 
while the share  
( ) svlTF =−                [9] 
opens a vacancy in the underground sector. Entrepreneurs may thus post a vacancy and then 
fill the job, or fail to fill it, in one of the two sectors, so that it can be simply stated that 
sr vlv −−=1 .
8
  
 Equation [7] can be re-written in a more general form as follows: 
( )svTT =
                
[10] 
Equation [10] highlights the relationship between the two variables sv  and T, and it can thus 
be called the T-curve. Only the variable sv  is defined in [10] because in this subsection the 
variable u appearing in [7] is taken as exogenous, thus underlining the fact that it is taken by 
entrepreneurs as given, while in the next subsection u will be a function of sv . The 
relationship is negative in equation [10] because of the wage cost effect, and the effects due to 
search or congestion externalities (see Pissarides, 2000). In fact, if the irregular vacancies 
increase, wages increase and the probability of filling them is lower. Therefore, it is more 
difficult to fill an irregular vacancy and fewer entrepreneurs enter the irregular sector. It can 
be proved that 0/ <∂∂ svT  under restrictions very similar to those required for ( )svTT = > 0 
(see Appendix A). 
                                                 
8
 In this model, the number of incumbent entrepreneurs, who run nr + ns firms, is exogenous and adds to those 
who enter the market. Matters thus become simpler without loss of generality. 
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Equation [10] can be coupled with equation [9], which represents the distribution of 
ability across (irregular) entrepreneurs. In this equation sv  is monotonically rising in T from 
minx  up to maxx . Both equations [9] and [10] can thus be depicted in the diagram with axes 
[ sv ,T ], as in Fig. 2. Equation [10] has been built under the following condition: 
( ) ( )
( ) min~1 1
1lim x
ryAy
zAAczT
sr
r
vlv rs ≥+−+
−+⋅++
=
−−→ κ
τ  
so that the available entrepreneurial ability is sufficient to open some vacancies. 
Lemma 2. A unique intersection between the two curves exists, thus determining the 
partial equilibrium of the model, since u is taken as given. 
========== Fig. 2 about here (now at the end) ========== 
From this result, and from the previous one represented in Fig. 1, a further result 
follows, thus substantiating the statement that the minimum level of entrepreneurial ability to 
profitably open a new vacancy, i.e. minx , strictly regards the underground sector. 
Lemma 3. The less able entrepreneurs open irregular vacancies; the abler 
entrepreneurs open regular vacancies. 
This result strengthens the previous section’s conclusion about wages. 
 
2.3 Unemployment and the steady state general equilibrium 
Although the economy has two sectors, we empirically observe a single rate of 
unemployment, which is defined thus: 
sr
srsr
sr
nnlu
nnluu
uuu
−−=⇒


−−=+
+=
                                                                                 [11] 
where 
rn  and sn  represent steady-state employment in the regular and underground sector, 
respectively. Since unemployed workers can search for a job only in one of the two sectors, 
we assume that the larger the size of the sector, the greater the number of job-seekers in that 
sector. Without loss of generality, we can thus assume that uus ⋅= α  and ( ) uur ⋅−= α1 , 
where ( )svαα = , 0lim 0 >=→ ααsv  and ( ) 1lim 1 <=−→ ααlvs , lvs −
−
=∂∂
1
/ ααα . The 
parameters α  and α  can be very close to 0 and 1 respectively. 
 Since jobs arrive to unemployed workers at the rate ( )ig θ , with { }sri ,∈ , and regular 
and irregular filled jobs are destroyed at the rate δ  and ( )ρδ + , respectively, then in the 
steady-state equilibrium it must be that: 
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( )( ) ( )rsr guvn θαδ ⋅⋅−=⋅ 1                       [12] 
( ) ( ) ( )sss guvn θαρδ ⋅⋅=⋅+           [13]
 
 
Steady-state unemployment is thus given by equations [11], [12] and [13]: 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
1
+
+




⋅
+




−
⋅−
=
ρδ
α
θ
α
δ
α
θ
α
s
s
s
s
r
s
v
gv
v
gv
l
u = ( ) ( ) 1+
+
+
ρδ
θ
δ
θ sr MM
l
                  
   
[14] 
where the M-function has the same basic properties as the original g-function (see Appendix 
A), and where 
rrr uv /=θ , ( )sr vlv −−= 1  and sss uv /=θ . 
 Equation [14] can be rewritten in general and explicit form as follows: 
u = u(vs)                                                                             
                                       
   
[15] 
where steady-state unemployment u is a function of vacancies in the underground sector only. 
Equation [15] can be depicted as a U-shaped curve in the (vs, u)-axes over the relevant range 
of vs, with perfect symmetry in the case of ρ = 0. Equation [15] closes the general equilibrium 
model formed by the system including the three main equations [7], [9] and [15] in the three 
unknowns vs, T, and u. It is intuitive that the equilibrium result obtained in the previous 
subsection (where u was taken as given), which concerned the intersection between the curves 
represented in [9] and [10], does not qualitatively change under the condition that u changes 
only moderately through equation [15]. It can be proved that this condition is 
ss
s
r v
vu
θθ
1)(1
<
∂
∂
<− , which obviously holds for intermediate levels of vs (see Appendix A).  
It can also be proved that the equilibrium result does not qualitatively change, even in 
the complementary conditions, i.e. 
rs
s
v
vu
θ
1)(
−<
∂
∂
 and 
ss
s
v
vu
θ
1)(
>
∂
∂
, which may hold when vs 
takes extreme values. In these two cases the macroeconomic condition of the labour market 
affects both the regular and the underground sector. In fact, for vs close to zero, ss vvu ∂∂ )(  
may be so negative that both θs and θr rise, but θs rises more than θr, while for vs close to 
(1−l), 
ss vvu ∂∂ )(  may be so positive that both θs and θr diminish, but θs diminishes less than 
θr (see Appendix A). 
Therefore, this concluding proposition can be obtained: 
Proposition 1. The solutions for the four key variables sv , rv , T  and u  are obtained 
by considering: 1) the present discounted values of the vacancies, i.e. equations [1] and [2]; 
2) the entrepreneurs’ indifference condition between open vacancies in the two sectors, given 
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their entrepreneurial ability distribution, and the threshold level of entrepreneurial ability, 
i.e. equations [6] and [7]; 3) the unemployment identity [11] and the equilibrium condition of 
the transition flows on the supply side of the labour market, i.e. equations [12] and [13]. The 
solutions can be interior solutions for sv , rv  within their relevant range, and are not 
necessarily unique solutions. 
 
2.4 Discussion 
The main result of the model of this section is that not only is there an interior solution 
whereby both the underground sector and the regular sector survive in equilibrium (Boeri and 
Garibaldi, 2006; Albrecht et. al., 2009), but this equilibrium is determined by allocating 
heterogeneous entrepreneurial ability between the two sectors (Rauch, 1991; Carillo and 
Pugno, 2004). This may explain the so-called “shadow puzzle”, i.e. the persistence of the 
underground sector despite advances in detection technologies and greater organisation by 
public authorities to reduce irregularities (issue (i) in the Introduction). This kind of 
explanation runs counter to the argument that the underground sector is an incubator of infant 
industries (see also La Porta and Shleifer, 2008; Rauch, 1991; Levenson and Maloney, 1998). 
The second result is that the greater the relative size of the regular sector, the higher 
the wage gap between the regular and the underground sector. The gap is always positive for 
a sufficiently higher level of productivity in the regular sector. 
A number of other important results can be drawn from comparative statics exercises, 
although described only in dynamic terms for conciseness. A general exercise concerns the 
effects of the shift of the T-curve due to changes in some parameters. Its downward shift 
decreases both the (partial) equilibrium of sv  in Fig. 2, and the model’s (general) equilibrium 
of sv , and hence also sθ . Therefore, this downward shift squeezes the proportion of the 
underground sector and expands the proportion of the regular sector, as clearly emerges from 
equations [8] and [9]. 
The downward shift of the T-curve can thus increase overall output, because it 
increases the proportion of the most productive sector. The regular sector is in fact more 
productive than the underground sector for two reasons: the regular sector exhibits a greater 
labour productivity, and the most able entrepreneurs prefer this sector. In fact, for a greater 
number of regular vacancies made possible by the shift of the abler entrepreneurs from the 
underground sector, both the number of regular matches, ( )rrr uvmm ,= , and employment in 
the regular sector, rn , are greater because of the greater probability of finding a regular job. 
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 The main policy implications can be drawn from the effects of the changes in the 
policy parameters on T, and hence on the proportion of the underground sector, i.e.: 
0<
∂
∂
ρ
T
; 0>
∂
∂
τ
T
; 0>
∂
∂
rc
T
. 
In other words, closer monitoring, lower taxation and lower costs for posting official 
vacancies reduce the underground sector. This is in line with the conclusions of other models 
(see e.g. Friedman et al., 2000; Johnson et al., 2000; Sarte, 2000; Bouev, 2005). Considering 
the parameter κ in [7] adds the result that a greater moral cost to open an irregular vacancy 
reduces the underground sector. 
 A new contribution of this model regards a much more controversial question, i.e. the 
ambiguous relationship between underground economy and unemployment (issue (ii) in the 
Introduction). This relationship is represented by equation [15], which is U-shaped, thus 
showing that 
ss vvu ∂∂ )( <0 when vs is relatively small, and ss vvu ∂∂ )( >0 when vs is relatively 
great. But if ρ increases, then the minimum of u=u(vs) shifts in the region where vs is closer to 
zero. A more precise Proposition can thus be stated: 
Proposition 2. If vs ≤vr, the relationship between vs and u is negative if ρ is sufficiently 
low, it is positive if ρ is sufficiently high. If vs>vr the relationship between vs and u is positive 
for any ρ (see Appendix B for proof). 
 This is an interesting result from a policy implications point of view. In fact, the role 
of the monitoring parameter is strengthened, since any policy intended to reduce the irregular 
sector may also reduce the unemployment rate if ρ is sufficiently high.9 
 
3. The model with investment in education and endogenous productivity 
growth 
The relationship between economic growth and unemployment has been recently investigated 
by focusing the analysis on the role of technology. The present paper takes another look, 
although maintaining the long-run perspective, by recognising that in economies not at the 
technological frontier, the underground sector may play a major role because a substantial 
share of the economy produces with this different type of organisation. 
                                                 
9
 Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2009) focus on the role of the job destruction rate. According to their matching 
model, policies that reduce the cost of formality (or those that increase the cost of informality) produce an 
increase in the share of formal employment while also reducing unemployment because the reallocation between 
formal and informal jobs has non-neutral effects on the unemployment rate, since informal jobs record much 
higher separation rates (namely, more inflows into unemployment). 
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This section will show that economic growth and unemployment may be negatively or 
positively correlated, depending on the level of the monitoring rate on the regularity of firms, 
which both captures the country’s rule of law and affects the size of the underground sector. 
For this purpose, our matching model will be extended in order to study steady-state growth, 
and some cross-country evidence will provide empirical plausibility to backup the theoretical 
results. Possibilities of multiple equilibria of steady-growth will be further explored. 
 
3.1 A steady-growth solution of the model 
This paper assumes that human capital accumulation is the primary engine of 
economic growth. In the growth literature, workers’ human capital usually refers to “the 
average level of educational attainment” (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Benhabib and Spiegel, 
1994) or similarly to “the average total years of schooling” (Savvides and Stengos, 2009). 
Specifically, education and schooling enable workers to absorb knowledge and acquire 
additional human capital once employed (Rosen, 1976; Stokey, 1991; Laing et al., 1995). 
Therefore, it can be stated that the higher the level of schooling or knowledge (k) and the 
larger the human capital accumulation (h), the higher the rate of economic growth.  
To simplify matters, and without loss of generality, we assume h = k, so that education 
and human capital can be used interchangeably. Then, we specify a simple equation for the 
rate of productivity growth (γ ): 
( )hγγ =                  with ( ) 0' >hγ                                                                                          [16] 
with the further property that ( )hr γ>  h ∀ , in order to keep present values finite. 
Since the education level and skill of the workers employed in the regular sector are 
higher than those in the underground sector (Albrecht et. al., 2009; Cappariello and Zizza, 
2009), growth is expected to be faster in the regular sector. This link is assumed in the form of 
labour-augmenting technological progress à la Pissarides (2000), where, specifically, 
workers’ human capital plays two roles, as suggested by Laing et al. (1995). In fact, since 
human capital is firstly acquired through formal education, workers can be employed with an 
initial productivity ( 0y ) that depends on the level of schooling (h). Secondly, workers’ 
productivity increases according to the rate of productivity growth. Let us then state the 
following assumption: 
Assumption 3. The total discounted value of productivity in the regular sector is given 
by: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )hr
hydtehyehy thtrr γ
γ
−
⇒⋅⋅= ∫
∞
⋅⋅− 0
0
0                                                                               [17] 
where: 
0y = 0y (h)                    with 0y ’(h) > 0, 0lim 00 >→ yh , ∞<∞→ 0lim yh                                 [18] 
Productivity in the underground sector is given by: 
( )hyy rs ⋅= ϕ   with 10 << ϕ           [19] 
According to this assumption, the underground sector partially benefits from this process 
because of spill-over effects in the diffusion of knowledge. Therefore, both sectors can grow 
at the same rate ( )hγ , while the level of productivity in the regular sector remains higher than 
that of productivity in the underground sector. The static model of the previous section should 
also be re-specified so that the variables τ,, sr cc  and z are indexed to the productivity levels. 
In this way, the costs of posting vacancies, taxes and the opportunity cost of employment are 
commensurate with the changing production level of the economy. 
In order to endogenise the rate of productivity growth, let us consider the optimal 
choice of education for individuals, given that schooling investment is costly (cf. Laing et al., 
1995; Decreuse and Granier, 2007), and that only regular firms profitably employ educated 
workers. Formally: 
Assumption 4. Let the cost function of education be c(k), with ( ) 0' >kc , ( ) 0'' >kc  
and ( ) 0/0 =∂∂ kc , because of either a direct pecuniary cost or the disutility from scholastic 
effort. Each job-seeker in the regular sector solves the following program:10 
( )( )[ ] ( ){ }kcwkyw srrk −−≥  max0  
where ( )( ) srr wkyw −  is the net gain from investing in education, i.e. the wage differential. 
The optimal investment in education (k*) can be thus obtained by the usual condition: 
( )( ) ( )
k
kc
k
kyw rr
∂
∂
=
∂
∂⇒                       [20] 
Condition [20] shows a positive relationship between rθ  and k, i.e. 0>∂
∂
r
k
θ
, besides the 
implication that k* > 0, since 0>
∂
∂
r
rw
θ
. In fact, a rise in rθ  increases the regular wages. 
                                                 
10
 Workers invest in education before entering the labour market in Laing et al. (1995). Unlike Laing et al. 
(1995) and Decreuse and Granier (2007), in this model the optimal choice of education is linked to the wage 
differential rather than to the value of searching for a job. Furthermore, following Dulleck et al. (2006), we can 
assume that the costs of higher education in the shadow sector tend to infinity. 
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Hence, in order to search for a job (work) in the regular sector, more workers choose to invest 
in education. In turn, the higher the optimal investment in education, the greater the human 
capital and the greater the productivity level of the economy. Therefore, the increase in the 
size of the regular sector, i.e. rθ , spurs economic growth by a greater investment in education. 
It follows that, from a macroeconomic point of view, the investment in education is on 
the one hand negatively linked to the size of the underground sector, and on the other, 
positively linked to the productivity growth of the economy. The following Proposition can 
thus be stated: 
Proposition 3. The solution of the steady-state model can be extended to include the 
optimal investment in education (k*), and the rate of productivity growth of the economy (γ), 
thus finding a steady-growth solution. 
 These results, together with Proposition 2 of the previous section regarding the 
relationship between the underground economy and unemployment, help understand the 
relationship between economic growth and unemployment (issue (iii) in the Introduction). 
Indeed, under the condition that vs ≤vr, the relationship between ( )hγ  and u is positive if ρ is 
low, while this relationship is negative if ρ is high. 
Our analysis is thus able to reconcile the conflicting results found in the literature on 
growth and unemployment. This suggestion is alternative to Aghion and Howitt’s approach, 
nevertheless it refers to the structure of the economy. Since the condition vs ≤vr is the usual 
condition used throughout the world, the monitoring rate becomes a very important 
parameter. Not only does it affect the size of the underground sector, but it may positively 
affect both unemployment and economic growth. 
The ambiguous relationship between growth and unemployment that has been found 
in theory is plausible from an empirical point of view. In fact, different authors obtain 
different results concerning the sign of the correlation between growth and unemployment, 
both across countries and across long periods of time in the same country (Aghion and 
Howitt, 1994; Bean and Pissarides, 1993; Caballero, 1993; Hoon and Phelps, 1997; 
Muscatelli and Tirelli, 2001). This issue has been effectively synthesised by Mortensen 
(2005), who shows that the correlation between average growth and average unemployment 
over the past ten years across 29 European countries is essentially zero. 
 However, Pissarides and Vallanti (2004, 2007) have found that, on the basis of a panel 
of advanced countries, productivity growth is strongly negatively correlated with 
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unemployment in the long run. They thus conclude that technological progress seems to have 
mainly taken the form of ‘disembodied technology’.11 
 If less advanced countries are also considered in the study of the relationship between 
growth and unemployment, such as European transition countries and Latin American 
countries, interesting results emerge. In fact, simple cross-country econometric estimates 
show results that are both consistent with those of Pissarides and Vallanti when the sample is 
restricted to advanced countries, and that support the conclusions of our model when the 
sample is extended. 
 Since the key variable of our model is the monitoring rate, we have to find a suitable 
variable which is negatively correlated with the underground economy but linked to the 
monitoring rate. A natural candidate is the ‘rule of law’ index, which captures perceptions of 
the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in 
particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as 
well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The correlation coefficient between shadow 
(underground) economy and the ‘rule of law’ index is about –0.75.12 This result does not 
change by using other proxies for the monitoring rate, such as the ‘government effectiveness’ 
index and/or ‘the corruption perception’ index, since the correlation coefficients among them 
are extremely high.13 
 Econometric estimates show clear results (see Tables 3 and 4 and the dataset in Tables 
1 and 2). In synthesis, the unemployment rate has been regressed by using the rates of 
economic growth for the whole sample. The estimate has been firstly controlled for three 
regional dummies, thus capturing institutional and cultural differences, i.e. DEU_non-transition, 
DEU_transition, and DLatin-American. The estimate of the equation: 
ii3AmericanLatin2ionEU_transit1i εgrowthβDβDβconsunempl +⋅+⋅+⋅+= −         (I) 
exhibits a non significant correlation, since the null hypothesis that 0=3β  is not rejected at 
any customary confidence level. Obviously, both 1β  and 2β  exhibit positive signs since the 
unemployment rate in the EU transition countries and Latin-American countries is higher than 
in the EU non-transition countries. 
                                                 
11
 More precisely, the “capitalisation” effect seems to dominate, while the “creative destruction” effect seems to 
play no role in the steady-state unemployment dynamics, since at reasonable parameter values a nontrivial 
negative impact of growth on unemployment is incompatible with embodied technology. 
12
 The shadow (underground) economy is calculated as % of GDP (1996-2007 average) according to Schneider 
et al. (2010). 
13
 Indeed, the correlation between “rule of law” and “government effectiveness” is higher than 0.90. 
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In the second estimate, the control for the ‘rule of law’ index is instead introduced. 
The dummy variable Drule assumes value 1 if the index is high and zero otherwise.14 The 
estimate of the equation: 
ii2irule1i εgrowthβgrowthDβconsunempl +⋅+⋅⋅+=          (II) 
exhibits significant results.15 When Drule = 0, higher growth predicts greater unemployment 
( 0.511β2 = ), and when Drule = 1, higher growth predicts lower unemployment 
( 373.0−=+ 21 ββ ). In the estimate (II) there is also an increase in the Adjusted-R-square 
(from 17% to 19%). Both estimates (I) and (II) are statistically correct and satisfy all the main 
statistical tests. 
==========  Tabs. 1,2,3 and 4 about here ========= 
 
3.2 The case of multiple equilibria 
The extended model may also be adapted in order to account for a special case: that of 
regional dualism, i.e. the failure of the more backward region to catch up with the more 
developed region. 
Let us assume that ( )hy0  is a logistic function, i.e. it performs increasing returns to 
human capital before the usual and eventual decreasing returns. This form may be due to 
thresholds in human capital, i.e. once human capital attains a certain threshold level (critical 
mass) productivity may reach a higher steady-state level (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990). This 
pattern has also received some empirical evidence (Savvides and Stengos, 2009).16 
Under this assumption, the relationship between T  and sv  may change significantly. 
Indeed, if the functions [17] and [19] are plugged into [7], then multiple equilibria become 
possible since the T–curve may display an increasing part in the middle, thus crossing the 
other curve twice, as depicted in Fig. 2 (dotted line).17 
The two extreme equilibria may be labelled as “good” and “bad” because they define 
two different conditions where the proportion of the underground sector is small and, 
                                                 
14
 Precisely, we use as threshold value an index of rule of law equal to 82. This value is calculated as the mean 
between the maximum and average values (by excluding, however, the too low value of Venezuela). 
15
 The results do not differ much if the ‘rule of law’ index is used as a continuous variable. Indeed, in this case, 
we have a lower adjusted-R-square. 
16
 The models which describe general nonlinearities in the relationship between growth and human capital do not 
provide specific functional forms (Savvides and Stengos, 2009). Azariadis and Drazen (1990) even study a step 
functional form, where thresholds are more than one. 
17
 As shown by Savvides and Stengos (2009) – adapted from Azariadis and Drazen (1990) – a step functional 
form may generate the possibility of multiple equilibria, with different balanced growth paths. This growth 
process comes to an end when “labour productivity attains the highest possible value and the system settles 
down on the ultimate stage of growth” (Azariadis and Drazen, 1990, p. 517). 
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respectively, large, with the consequent desirable and undesirable characterisations. 
Specifically, in the “good” equilibrium one region exhibits higher productivity, a more 
efficient use of entrepreneurial ability, higher investment in education, greater employment of 
skilled workers, and, finally, a higher rate of economic growth with respect to the region in 
the “bad” equilibrium.  
This result is interesting because it can represent an economy characterised by a 
uniform institutional set-up, as captured by the parameters of the model, but with two regions 
that differ in their histories, as captured by the different relative sizes of the underground 
sector. The region that has inherited from the past a sufficiently greater proportion of the 
underground sector will tend to the “bad” equilibrium, at least in the case of scarce mobility 
of labour. The region that has inherited a smaller proportion of the underground sector will 
tend to the “good” equilibrium. The economy will thus exhibit regional dualism, which may 
persist even in the long run, because the region in the “bad” equilibrium also performs a 
relatively lower steady-growth. This case seems to be the best fit with the Italian North-South 
divide, which is distinctive but not unique in the world. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The persistence of the underground sector, albeit different extents, in all countries around the 
world has been documented by many studies, and has been called the ‘shadow puzzle’. How 
the underground sector relates with unemployment has also been studied, without clarifying, 
however, whether the relationship is positive or negative. Research on the underground sector 
encounters a third issue which is related to economic growth, i.e. whether the relationship 
between unemployment and economic growth is negative or positive. At microeconomic 
level, several studies have found that underground firms employ relatively backward 
technology, less educated, less skilled, and less paid workers, as well as less able 
entrepreneurs, i.e. lower quality inputs for growth. This microeconomic evidence has 
suggested useful links for building a matching-type model of endogenous growth that is able 
to account for both the ‘shadow puzzle’ and the two ambiguous relationships. 
The key assumption of the model, which is also rather new in matching models, is that 
entrepreneurial ability is a heterogeneous input for production. If also workers are not 
homogeneous because they can become educated and skilled, then two types of firms emerge: 
the more productive firms where the ablest entrepreneurs match with skilled workers, and the 
less productive firms where the less able entrepreneurs match with unskilled workers. These 
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latter firms form the underground sector, because they can persistently survive on the market 
by evading taxes and paying lower wages. Their role in the economic growth is negative, 
because they discourage human capital accumulation and hence productivity growth. 
The model predicts that monitoring firms’ regularity determines whether or not 
unemployment is complementary to underground employment, and, consequently, whether 
unemployment is positively or negatively related with economic growth. Some econometric 
evidence supports this role of law enforcement in making the relationship between 
unemployment and economic growth positive or negative. 
The model used is rather general (and the growth equation rather simple), so that it can 
be applied to a number of cases. In the paper, the case is made for EU non-transition and 
Latin American countries, which exhibit a high share of underground sector. Another 
interesting case is regional dualism, e.g. the North-South dualism in Italy, where some 
backward regions diverge from the others, although both groups share the same institutional 
set-up. For this case the model has been made more specific by assuming sufficient non-
linearities in the human capital accumulation function, so that multiple equilibria emerge in 
the size of the underground sector. 
A number of policy implications ensue from this analysis. Reducing the tax burden 
becomes especially effective if monitoring is at a high level, because underground firms are 
discouraged without raising unemployment. In the long run, this may also enhance growth. 
These same results follow if monitoring is itself increased. In the case of regional dualism, a 
one-shot change in the policy parameters may trigger an endogenous dynamic of convergence 
between the two regions. More generally, an effective policy should seek to increase 
entrepreneurial ability, typically through education, so that overall economic performance 
improves, both because of the sectoral composition effect, and because of the positive level 
effect of each firm.  
 
Appendices 
Appendix A: Proof that 0<∂∂ svT  
It will be firstly proved that 0<∂∂ svT  (with rs vlv ~1] −−∈ , sv~ [ and vr=1−l−vs) when u is 
assumed as exogenous, as in subsection 2.2, and then when u is assumed as endogenous, as in 
subsection 2.3.  
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Sufficient conditions for 0<∂∂ svT  are that 0<∂∂ svN  and 0>∂∂ svD , where N and 
D are the numerator and the denominator of T in [7]. To prove this, let us observe, from the 
definitions of A and B in [7], that 0<∂∂ svA  and 0>∂∂ svB , because 0>∂∂ rA θ , 
0<∂∂ sr vθ , and 0>∂∂ sB θ , 0>∂∂ ss vθ . Therefore, svN ∂∂  is negative if ( )zcr +> τ  and 
zcs > , as it emerges from the derivative of N: 
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while 
svD ∂∂  is always positive, as it emerges from the derivative of D: 
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The restriction set of the parameters for both T>0 and 0<∂∂ svT  thus becomes: 
( ) zczc sr >>+> τ , and yr sufficiently greater than ys. 
Subsection 2.3 assumes that u is endogenous through equation [14]. In this equation 
the M-function has the same basic properties as the original g-function, i.e.: 
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1lim 1 < ∞ ; both the M-function and the 
g-function are monotonic and concave.  
Equation [14] is U-shaped within the relevant range of vs. In fact, the derivative of 
u(vs) can thus be calculated through some manipulations: 
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While the denominator of [A.3] is always positive because M(θi) is a concave function so that 
( ) ( )
i
i
i
i MM
θ
θ
θ
θ
∂
∂
> , the numerator is negative for relatively small vs, and it is positive for 
relatively great vs, because, again, M(θi) is a concave function. 
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 The fact that u(vs) is U-shaped maintains that 0<∂∂ svN  and 0>∂∂ svD  in [7], so 
that 0<∂∂ svT . This can be proved by distinguishing the intermediate range of vs around the 
minimum of u(vs), from the extreme ranges, where vs is either close to zero or close to (1−l). 
In the former case, ( ) ss vvu ∂∂  is relatively small, so that it can satisfy these conditions: 
ss
s
r v
vu
θθ
1)(1
<
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<− , which guarantee that 0<∂∂ sr vθ  and 0>∂∂ ss vθ , and thus also that 
0<∂∂ svA  and 0>∂∂ svB , because 
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vuv )(11)( θ . This case also holds for the extreme ranges of vs, if M(θi) is not 
very concave. 
 In the lower range of vs, where it is close to zero, the condition 
s
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θ
 emerges, 
if M(θi) is very concave, as in the Cobb-Douglas specification of the matching equation. In 
this case, the derivatives 
sr v∂∂θ  and svA ∂∂ take the “perverse” positive sign, while ss v∂∂θ  
and 
svB ∂∂  maintain the positive sign, although increasing in size both because the numerator 
of θs rises and because its denominator diminishes. The limit of [A.1] makes it evident that 
svN ∂∂ <0: 
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were Cobb-Douglas. Similar reasoning can be applied to D, which would be equal to ∞  at the 
limit of the Cobb-Douglas case. 
 In the upper range of vs, where it is close to (1−l), the condition 
ss
s
v
vu
θ
1)(
>
∂
∂
 emerges, 
if M(θi) is very concave. In this case, the derivatives ss v∂∂θ  and svB ∂∂  take the “perverse” 
negative sign, while the derivatives 
sr v∂∂θ  and svA ∂∂ maintain the negative sign, although 
becoming even more negative, both because the numerator of θs diminishes and because its 
denominator rises. The limit of [A.1] makes it evident that, again, 
svN ∂∂ <0: 
( ) ( )21 1lim +
−
∂
∂
−−−
∂
∂
=
−→ B
zc
v
B
ztc
v
AN s
s
r
s
lvs
, which would be equal to ∞−  if the matching function 
were Cobb-Douglas. Similar reasoning can be applied again to D, which would be equal to ∞  
at the limit of the Cobb-Douglas case. 
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Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 2 
Equation [14] is perfectly symmetric with respect to vs if ρ=0, so that u(vs) is at the minimum 
when vs=vr. If ρ>0, the minimum lies in the region where vs<vr. In fact, the condition for the 
minimum ( ) ss vvu ∂∂ =0 that can be derived from [A.3] is ( )( )r
s
M
M
θ
θ
δ
ρδ
'
'
=
+
. This condition 
states that the greater is ρ, the smaller the level of vs for which u(vs) is at the minimum. 
Therefore, for any given vs such that ( ) ss vvu ∂∂ <0 at some level of ρ, there exists a 
sufficiently greater level of ρ such that ( ) ss vvu ∂∂ >0. Note that this important result holds 
even if two different concave matching functions governed the two sectors, although the 
downward bound of the range of vs where ( ) ss vvu ∂∂ >0 for any ρ would be different from 
vs=vr. 
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FIGURE 1. Entrepreneurs’ indifference condition 
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TABLE 1. Dataset 
EU non-transition 
countries 
unemployment rate      
(%) * 
GDP growth rate      
(%) * 
Rule of Law ** 
(Percentile Rank 
***) 
Austria 3.73 2.29 99.0 
Belgium 6.40 2.04 89.0 
Cyprus 3.63 3.77 84.2 
Denmark 3.88 1.56 99.5 
Finland 6.76 3.21 97.6 
France 7.44 1.90 90.0 
Germany 8.51 1.47 93.3 
Greece 7.98 3.98 73.2 
Ireland 3.74 5.02 94.3 
Italy 6.43 1.16 62.2 
Luxembourg 3.06 4.27 96.2 
Malta 4.69 1.80 91.4 
Netherlands 2.88 2.16 94.7 
Portugal 5.48 5.84 83.7 
Spain 8.43 2.80 85.2 
Sweden 4.92 4.71 98.1 
United Kingdom 3.71 1.70 92.3 
    
 
EU transition countries 
unemployment rate      
(%) * 
GDP growth rate      
(%) * 
Rule of Law ** 
(Percentile Rank 
***) 
Bulgaria 10.94 5.59 51.2 
Czech Republic 6.18 4.20 77.0 
Estonia 7.86 7.02 84.7 
Hungary 5.73 3.52 76.1 
Latvia 8.91 7.32 71.3 
Lithuania 9.47 6.97 67.5 
Poland 13.11 1.32 65.1 
Romania 5.46 5.70 53.6 
Slovakia 13.52 4.32 67.0 
Slovenia 4.92 3.31 82.3 
 
 
* (2000 - 2008) average. 
Source: (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/themes) 
** Source: (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_countries.asp) 
*** Percentile rank, from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). More precisely, according to the World Bank, the 
‘Rule of Law’ index measures the quality of contract enforcement, the police and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 
 
TABLE 2. Dataset 
Latin America 
countries 
Unemployment 
rate *  
GDP growth 
rate ** 
Rule of Law 
index *** 
Argentina 12.95 2.51 32.10 
Bolivia 5.2 1.47 12.00 
Brazil 8.99 2.08 46.40 
Chile 7.46 3.51 88.00 
Colombia 13.92 2.73 37.80 
Costa Rica 6.01 2.74 62.70 
Dominican Republic 14.7 3.85 33.00 
Ecuador 8.99 3.05 9.10 
El Salvador 6.75 1.06 30.60 
Guatemala 2.25 1.50 12.90 
Honduras 4.48 2.85 20.60 
Mexico 3.2 1.72 29.70 
Nicaragua 7.64 0.91 21.10 
Panama 11.85 3.45 49.80 
Paraguay 7.52 -0.20 15.30 
Peru 7.94 3.40 25.80 
Uruguay 12.77 1.58 65.60 
Venezuela, R. B. de 12.28 2.63 2.90 
 
* (%) of labour force (2000-2008) average. Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/  
** (2000 - 2007) average.                                                                                                               
Source: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3, 
Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of 
Pennsylvania, August 2009.  
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php 
*** Source: (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_countries.asp).                                                                                                                          
Percentile rank, from 0 (worst) to 100 (best). 
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Table 3. Estimate of the equation (I) 
 
Dependent variable: unemployment rate 
Independent variables Coefficients 
Growth 0.138 (0.42) 
Dummy (EU transition countries) 2.94  (2.12) ** 
Dummy (Latin-American) 3.30 (3.12) *** 
cons 4.99 (4.09) *** 
Statistical tests 
Ramsey RESET test 
H0: model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 38) = 0.79 
Prob > F = 0.51 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
H0: Constant variance 
chi2(1)      =     3.92 
Prob > chi2  =   0.0478 
Robust standard errors 
Mean VIF 1.48 
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality Prob>chi2 = 0.494 
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data Prob>z = 0.351 
Full model Prob > F  =  0.0148 ** 
Adj R-squared  0.167 
Obs. 45 
Notes. The estimation method is OLS. Numbers in brackets after the coefficients are t-statistics. The 
symbol *** denotes significance at 1% confidence level; ** denotes significance at 5% confidence 
level; * denotes significance at 10% confidence level. 
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Table 4. Estimate of the equation (II) 
 
Dependent variable: unemployment rate 
Independent variables Coefficients 
Growth 0.511 (1.81) * 
Dummy of interaction (Rule of Law  * Growth) –0.884 (–3.42) *** 
cons 6.95 (7.44) *** 
Statistical tests 
Ramsey RESET test 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 39) = 1.10 
Prob > F = 0.361 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
chi2(1) = 2.25 
Prob > chi2  = 0.133 
Mean VIF 1.15 
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for Normality Prob>chi2 = 0.272 
Shapiro-Wilk W test for normal data Prob>z = 0.151 
Full model Prob > F =  0.0050 *** 
Adj R-squared 0.186 
Obs. 45 
Notes. The estimation method is OLS. Numbers in brackets after the coefficients are t-statistics. The 
symbol *** denotes significance at 1% confidence level; ** denotes significance at 5% confidence 
level; * denotes significance at 10% confidence level. 
 
